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TORT LAW - INSURANCE COVERAGE - INDEMNITY - The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that in seeking indemnity from an insurance
carrier for a claim arising out of the delivery of "professional health
care services," the actions of medical professionals will constitute
such services when the act that caused the harm amounts to a
medical skill associated with specialized training.
Physicians' Insurance Company v. Pistone, 726 A.2d 339 (Pa.
1999).
In September of 1993, Annette Yaworsky was admitted to
Pottsville hospital complaining of abdominal pain.' Dr. Francis J.
Pistone was the emergency physician on duty at the time, and he
examined Yaworsky, ordering a series of tests. 2 During the ensuing
days Yaworsky underwent surgery for gallstones at the hands of
other physicians associated with the hospital.3 On September 22,
1993, while Yaworsky was recovering, Pistone appeared in her
room ostensibly to conduct a physical examination.4 During this
examination Pistone proceeded to fondle Yaworsky's breasts, and
while so doing exposed his genitals and proceeded to masturbate.5
As a result of these actions, Pistone was charged under the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code with indecent assault and indecent
exposure, which charges were subsequently disposed of through a
plea agreement.
6
Yaworsky and her husband filed suit in the Schuykill County
Court of Common Pleas against Pistone, his employer Associated
Surgeons, and the hospital.7 The suit alleged negligence on the part
* Senior Staff Member, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne
University School of Law; B.A. 1996, Pennsylvania State University.
1. Physician's Ins. Co. v. Pistone, 726 A.2d 339, 340 (Pa. 1999).





7. See Schuykill County case No. S-494-1995, Baldwin, J. (entering summary judgment
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of the doctor for exposing the plaintiff to his perversion, on the
part of Associated for having hired Pistone, and on the part of the
hospital for granting Pistone privileges.8  Both Pistone and
Associated requested their medical malpractice insurance carrier,
Physicians' Insurance Company, to defend the case on their behalf,
but the carrier denied coverage.9 Thereafter Pistone failed to file an
answer and consequently, a default judgment was entered against
hii. 10
Physician's Insurance Company then filed an action seeking a
declaratory judgment as to their duty to defend this case under the
contract of insurance, and followed with a cross-motion for
summary judgment." The Yaworskys also filed a motion for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Physician's Insurance Company.12 The Yaworskys
appealed to the superior court, where the decision of the trial court
was affirmed.1 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur
to determine what test Pennsylvania should use when deciding if
otherwise tortious conduct constituted professional health care
services, thereby triggering the medical malpractice insurance
carrier's duty to indemnify.'4
In searching for the answer to the question, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court looked to the law of other states and found that
three viable standards exist for determining the scope of the term
"professional health care services." One approach is embodied in
the law of Arizona and is denominated the "intertwined with and
inseparable approach."' 5 Under this approach, conduct that is
tortious may nonetheless be professional health care services when
the conduct is intertwined with and inseparable from the services
in favor of the insurer).





13. Pistone, 726 A.2d at 340.
14. Id. Representing the parties before the supreme court were attorney Michael J.
Kowalski of Wilkes Barre for Physicians Insurance Co. & Professional Adjustment; attorney
Edward H. Heitmiller of Pottsville for Francis Pistone, M.D.; and attorneys Frederick J.
Fanelli and Sudhir R. Patel of Pottsville for Annette and John Yaworsky. Id.
Justice Sandra Schultz Newman delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice
John P. Flaherty, Jr. and Justices Ralph J. Cappy, Ronald D. Castille and Thomas G. Saylor.
Id. Justice Stephen A. Zappala concurred in the result. Id. Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 344 (Nigro, J., dissenting).




The second approach is that espoused by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, referred to as the "substantial nexus test," which asks
the question whether there exists a nexus between the offensive
conduct of the provider and the professional health care services
being administered. 17 New Jersey has found that the required nexus
existed when the tortious conduct complained of occurred during
the course of a medical examination to which the plaintiff
consented. 18
The final approach, and the one adopted by our supreme court in
the instant case, is entitled the Marx test, referencing the case in
which the Nebraska Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the
test. 19 In that case it was determined that a malpractice insurer's
liability should be limited to answering in causes of action that
arise from rendering of professional acts or services. 20 The
Nebraska Supreme Court further defined professional acts or
services as those that imply an intellectual skill and require the use
or application of special learning or attainments of some kind.
2'
The Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted and further clarified the
Marx test in Roe v. Federal Insurance Co., when it held that in
order for a malpractice insurer to be liable, the harm complained
of must follow from a medical act or service, not an act or service
requiring no professional skill.
22
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Marx test as
applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Roe as the legal
standard against which the liability of malpractice insurers should
be measured. 23 This ruling will require future courts to focus not on
the title or position of the person performing the act, but upon the
act itself. A malpractice insurance carrier will not be liable for
damages caused by its insured for acts which fall outside of the
parameters of the normal acts or services associated with the
particular profession.
16. Id. at 542.
17. Pistone, 726 A.2d at 344. (discussing Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 678 A.2d
1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).).
18. Id.
19. Marx v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 157 N.W. 2d 870, 871 (Neb. 1968).
20. Id. at 871.
21. Id. at 872.
22. Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 587 N.E. 2d 214, 217 (Mass. 1992).
23. Pistone, 726 A.2d at 344.
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TORT LAW - NEGLIGENCE - SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE - The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the "sudden emergency
doctrine" is not an affirmative defense which must be pleaded as
new matter under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Leahy v. McClain, 732 A.2d 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appeal
denied, 751 A.2d 192 (Pa. Dec. 16, 1999).
During the evening hours of January 26, 1994, the plaintiff was
traveling south on a two lane highway in the southern Montgomery
County borough of Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania. 24 It was dark
and it was snowing, casuing the roadway to be slippery.2 5 At a
point just south of the intersection of Butler Pike and Township
Line Road, the plaintiff lost control of her vehicle and slid into a
snow bank off of the west side of the roadway, coming to rest
facing east and blocking the southbound lane of traffic.26 The
highway at this location was described as having a drastic
downward slope.2 7 A short time later, the defendant approached the
accident scene from the north and was suddenly faced with the
blocked road situation created by the plaintiff.28 Faced with the
choice of going right into a clump of trees, going left into
oncoming traffic, or crashing into the roadway obstruction, the
defendant chose the latter and the ensuing collision resulted in the
plaintiff's injuries.
29
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant in
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas; the defendant's
answer and new matter did not raise the sudden emergency
doctrine.30 That proceeding ended when the court entered judgment
for the defendant on a jury verdict, based on a determination that
the defendant was not negligent.31 The plaintiff appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.32 The principal issue on appeal was
whether the sudden emergency doctrine is an affirmative defense
that must be pleaded specifically before it will support a jury
24. Leahy v. McClain, 732 A.2d 619, 620 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1999) appeal denied, 751 A.2d
192 (Pa. Dec. 16, 1999). The original plaintiff and appellant in this case was Valerie J. Leahy.





29. Leahy, 732 A.2d at 620.
30. Id. at 619. See Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division
95-23676, Lowe, J. (entering judgment for the defendant upon jury verdict).





The trial court had concluded that the sudden emergency
doctrine was not an affirmative defense, and the superior court
agreed.- As support for its conclusion, the superior court looked to
the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the 1995 case of
Lockhart v. List.3 5 In that case, the supreme court described the
sudden emergency doctrine as follows:
The rule recognizes that a driver who, although driving in a
prudent manner, is confronted with a sudden or unexpected
event which leaves little or no time to apprehend a situation
and act accordingly should not be subject to liability simply
because another perhaps more prudent course of action was
available. . . . [A] person confronted with a sudden and
unforeseeable occurrence, because of the shortness of time in
which to react, should not be held to the same standard of
care as someone confronted with a foreseeable occurrence.3 6
In arriving at its conclusion, the Leahy court relied upon the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for authority in holding that the
sudden emergency doctrine does not act as a defense per se but
merely a factor in determining the reasonableness of the actor's
conduct.37 The law only requires that a person act reasonably in
response to the circumstances associated with the situation
confronting him.38 Therefore, in assessing the conduct of a person
confronted with a sudden and unexpected (unforeseeable)
situation, the court and jury in determining the propriety of the
actor's conduct must take into account the fact that he is in a
position where he must make a speedy decision between
alternative courses of action and that, therefore, he has no time to
make an accurate forecast as to the effect of his choice. 39
TORT LAW - CONTRACTUAL DuTy - EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE - The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the relationship between a
33. Id.
34. Id. Leahy, at 621. Representing the parties before the superior court were attorney
Edward A. Stern of Conshohocken for Valerie Leahy, and attorney Adam A. Desipio of
Norristown for Gary McClain. Id. at 620.
Judge Joseph A. Hudock delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Judge J. Michael
Eakin and Judge John L. Musmanno. Id.
35. Id. at 622. See Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1995).
36. See Lockhart, 665 A-2d at 1180.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORm § 296(1), cmt.(b) (1965).
39. See Lockhart, 665 A.2d at 1180.
2000
Duquesne Law Review
University and a student is contractual in nature, and the student
may bring a cause of action against the University for breach of
contract where the college ignores the provisions of the pact
contained in the written material distributed in association with the
offer to confer a degree.
Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appeal
denied, 747 A.2d 902 (Pa. Dec. 9, 1999).
In 1985, Judith Swartley enrolled at Lehigh University ("the
University") as a Ph.D. candidate in Industrial Engineering.
40
Following the timely completion of her formal course work,
Swartley selected Dr. Mikell Groover as her advisor and chair of
the dissertation committee empaneled to review and approve her
dissertation on the subject of "progress inventory."41 Swartley and
Groover together selected the remaining four members of the
committee. 42 As work progressed on the dissertation, Swartley
received feedback and criticism of her work from the members of
the dissertation committee, the most significant being directed
toward the lack of meaningful statistical or mathematical analysis
of her research data.43 The presence of these problems in
Swartley's work resulted in a delay in scheduling her oral defense
of the work on two separate occasions.44
In 1990, Swartley took a leave of absence from her studies due
to a pregnancy, and the leave was extended to allow for her
recovery from complications resulting from the pregnancy.45 By the
time Swartley returned to school in 1993, it had become necessary
to replace two members on the dissertation committee.46 With
Swartley's approval, Groover appointed Dr. George Wilson and Dr.
Keith Gardiner, who were ultimately named as defendants in this
case.47 After spending another year working on her dissertation,
Swartley submitted to an oral defense of her work in December of
1994.4 Following this review, the dissertation committee voted
three to two to deny the award of a Ph.D., in effect giving the
40. Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appeal denied, 747 A.2d
902 (Pa Dec. 9, 1999).










student a failing grade.49
Swartley brought this suit in the Northampton County Court of
Common Pleas, for educational malpractice and breach of contract
against the University and its personnel, alleging that the University
failed to educate her and that the decision of the dissertation
committee amounted to arbitrary and capricious conduct.5° At the
close of the discovery phase of the case the University and its
personnel moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the
trial court.51 Swartley appealed that ruling to the superior court,
and the superior court affirmed.52
In initially addressing Swartley's claims, the court cited to
previous rulings which refused to recognize a general cause of
action based on educational malpractice where the allegation was
simply that the educational institution failed to provide a quality
education.5 The court did note, however, that the door had been
opened for a cause of action against an educational institution for
breach of contract in the case of Boehm v. University of
Pennsylvania School of Veterinary MedicineY4 In that case the
superior court concluded that the relationship which exists
between a school and its students is contractual in nature.5
Adopting the rule of Boehm in the case sub judice, the court
concluded that a student can bring a cause of action against an
educational institution for breach of contract where the institution
violates or ignores the provisions of the contract which consist of
the written guidelines, policies and procedures contained in the
written materials distributed to a student over the course of their
enrollment.5
In finding that Swartley's claim of breach of contract lacked
merit, the court cited Swartley's lack of any evidence of the
existence of a contractual provision setting forth the duties of a
dissertation committee, or any other link between her allegations
49. Id.
50. Swartley, 734 A.2d at 917.
51. Id.
52. Id. Representing the parties at the superior court were attorney Kevin T. Fogerty of
Allentown for Judith Swartley, and attorney John F. Hunsicker, Jr. of Philadelphia for Joel
Hoffner, et al. Swartey, 734 A.2d at 916.
Judge Olszewsld delivered the opinion of the court, including Judges Michael T. Joyce and
James R. Cavanaugh. Id. at 916.
53. Id. at 918 (citing Cavaliere v. Duffs Business Institute, 605 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992)).
54. Id. at 919 (citing Boehm v. University of Pa., 573 A.2d 575 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).




and the contractual relationship between the university and its
students.
57
Swartley also claimed that the provisions regarding the
requirements for candidates for the Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering
at Lehigh University support her contention that once she was
scheduled to participate in an oral defense of her dissertation,
there was a presumption that the work had been passed upon and
approved by the dissertation committee.68 The court characterized
this interpretation as "tortured," and citing to the provision in the
rules which allowed for review and revision of the dissertation
following the oral defense concluded that Swartley's contention
that the dissertation committee must vote to pass the student's
dissertation before scheduling an oral defense was contrary to the
plain meaning and logic of the provisions.5 9
In addressing Swartley's final contention that the committee
members' actions were arbitrary and capricious, the superior court
stated that generally the courts are not now, nor will they ever be,
expert in all fields of academic endeavor.60 Based upon the
foregoing, the court recognized that the standard of review to be
applied to essentially academic decisions is necessarily a limited
one.61 The court concluded, therefore, that when judges are asked
to review the substance of purely academic decisions, they should
show great respect for the professional judgment of a faculty and
not disturb their findings unless it is clear that their judgment was
the result of a clearly unprofessional exercise or deviated
substantially from the, accepted academic norms.
6 2
The superior court, through the application of the rules
enunciated by the Boehm court, found that a contract existed
between the University and its student. The terms governing that
relationship were found to be contained in the written materials
distributed to the student by the institution. In determining
whether, on the facts of this case, the actions of the University
faculty amounted to a breach of contract, the superior court found
that the materials distributed to the student did not contain a term
delineating the duties of a dissertation committee. Absent such a
57. Id.
58. Id. at 920.
59. Id. at 920, 921.
60. Id. at 921.
61. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985)). See also
Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall College, 538 A.2d 49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
62. Swarley, 734 A.2d at 921.
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term, the judgment of such a committee would be viewed as and
academic decision. The court reasoned that judicial tribunals lack
the expertise to second guess such decisions, and in the absence of
evidence to indicate that such decisions deviated substantially from
the norm, the court would defer to the professional judgment of
school authorities.
TORT LAW - STRICT LIABILITY - EFFECT OF RELEASE - The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a court, in assessing liability
among joint tortfeasors in a strict liability case, must give effect to
the terms of a "pro tanto" release when the amount of the
settlement is less than the plaintiffs total claim.
Baker v. ACandS Inc., 729 A.2d 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999),
affirmed, 755 A.2d 664 (Pa. June 26, 2000).
The original plaintiff, Albert J. Baker, brought this action in strict
liability and negligence against ACandS Inc. ("ACandS"), and four
other companies for injuries he sustained as a result of his
exposure to asbestos during his employment.6 The case was filed
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, and was
reverse bifurcated in accordance with the local rules of that court
regarding asbestos cases.64 Following the testimony on damages, a
jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of
two million dollars, and awarded the plaintiffs wife $200,000 in
damages for loss of consortium.65 Following this phase of the
proceedings, the plaintiff settled with four of the defendants,
negotiating "pro rata" releases with three defendants, and
negotiating a "pro tanto" release with the Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust ("Manville Trust") in the amount of $30,000
dollars.6 6 In the interim between the damages phase and the
liability phase, the plaintiff died of his asbestos related lung cancer
and his wife, Suzanne Baker, was substituted as plaintiff in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate.
67
As a result of the prior settlements, the only defendant remaining
in the case at the liability phase of the case was ACandS. 68 At the
conclusion of this phase, the court found all five of the remaining
63. Baker v. ACandS Inc., 729 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), affirmed, 755 A.2d
664 (Pa. June 26, 2000).




68. Baker, 729 A.2d at 1144. The liability phase was tried before the Honorable Victor
J. DiNubile, Jr., sitting without a jury. Id.
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defendants liable for the plaintiff's injuries and molded the verdict
to reflect a "pro rata" apportionment of liability.69 In so doing, the
court disregarded the settlement releases negotiated between the
plaintiff and the settling tortfeasors, finding that no tortfeasor
should be liable for more than their pro rata share. 70 Accordingly, it
ordered ACandS .to pay one fifth (20%) of the total award plus
delay damages totaling in excess of $17,000 dollars. 71 The plaintiff
appealed, asserting that ACandS should have been- liable for the
remainder of the pro rata share assigned to the Manville Trust
under the doctrine of joint and several liability.72 ACandS filed a
cross appeal on the issue of whether the evidence presented at the
liability phase was sufficient to support a finding of liability against
ACandS. 73
The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that the issue in this
case was to determine whether, in the context of a strict liability
situation, the shortfall occasioned by limits placed by court
supervised agreements upon recoveries from the Manville Trust in
asbestos cases may be recovered from a non-settling joint
tortfeasor following the granting of a "pro tanto" release to the
trust.
74
The Manville Trust was created to pay health claims brought
against the Johns-Manville Corporation as a result of asbestos
exposure.7 5 After the trust became insolvent following an excess of
claims and unanticipated large awards, the trust was restructured
via a class action suit which resulted in a settlement by which
plaintiffs, such as the one herein, would receive amounts equaling




72. Id. at 1140.
73. Baker, 729 A.2d at 1143.
74. Id. at 1144. Representing the parties were attorney R. Bruce McElhone of
Philadelphia for Suzanne Baker, and attorney Robert W Rowan of Philadelphia for ACandS
Inc. Id. at 1143.
This case was argued before the superior court sitting en banc. Judge Berle M. Schiller
delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Judges James R. Cavanaugh, John T.J. Kelly, Jr.
and Correale F Stevens. Id. at 1143. Judge Maureen Lally-Green authored a concurring
statement. Id. at 1154 (Lally-Green, J., concurring). Judge Joseph A. Del Sole joined the
majority and filed a concurring statement. Id. at 1154 (Del Sole, J., concurring). Judge J.
Michael Eakin filed a dissenting opinion, joined by President Judge Stephen J. McEwen, Jr.
and Judge Michael T. Joyce. Id. at 1155 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1145.
76. Id. See In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 929 E Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y 1996), aff'd, 100 F3d 944 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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case, the total payable by the trust was $30,000, which amount is
represented by the settlement amount in the "pro tanto" release
granted to the trust by the plaintiff.77 According to the provisions of
the trust, any amounts paid by the trust under the agreement are
applied as a set-off against the claim of the plaintiff as determined
by the law of the state of the proceeding.
78
In determining the law applicable to the particular set-offs in this
case, the superior court began by reviewing the Pennsylvania
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA). 7 9 The
court noted that the statute, by definition, makes joint tortfeasors
jointly and severally liable.80 The statute also contains provisions
which allow for the settlement of a claim against one joint
tortfeasor without effecting the plaintiff's ability to recover from
the remaining tortfeasors.8' Also, such a release does not relieve a
settling tortfeasor from liability for contribution unless the release
is given before the right to contribution accrues to another, and the
plaintiff agrees in the release to a reduction in the amount of his
claim equal to the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor.
8 2
The court also outlined the parameters within which parties to a
suit could construct a settlement agreement, concluding that the
law in Pennsylvania gives effect to the plain meaning of the
language of such a release. The court also noted that the law
allows for the parties to a release to select either of two options
regarding the extent of the reduction in the plaintiff's claim against
any non-settling tortfeasors resulting from such settlements.& The
plaintiff and the settling party can agree to a "pro tanto" release
which will reduce the plaintiff's claim against non-settling
tortfeasors by the amount actually received from the settling
tortfeasor, or they can agree to a "pro rata" release which reduces
the plaintiffs claim by the amount of the settling tortfeasor's pro
rata liability regardless of the amount of the consideration payed
for the release.95
The defendant ACandS argued that the rule in cases such as this
77. Baker, 729 A.2d at 1145.
78. Id. at 1146.
79. Id. (citing Pennsylvania's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 8321 et seq.).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1147.
82. Baker, 729 A.2d at 1147.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1148.
85. Id. at 1147 (citing Wirth v. Miller, 580 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
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was set forth in the case of Walton v. Avco, which would support a
finding that the defendant should be responsible for only its pro
rata share regardless of the existence of any prior settlements8 6
The court rejected this argument, stating that Walton did not stand
for such a broad application of the rule, as such would undermine
and negate the concept of and purposes behind the law of joint and
several liability applicable to cases such as these.
8 7
Alternatively, ACandS argued that Walton requires a set-off equal
to the settling tortfeasors pro-rata share, regardless of the terms of
the release.88 In rejecting this argument, the court looked to the
case of Charles v. Giant Eagle, which Walton relied on, and noted
the policy in force in the Commonwealth that favors promotion of
settlements and avoidance of windfalls to non-settling tortfeasors 9
Coupling the policy considerations outlined in Charles and
Walton with the proper interpretation of the UCATA, the court
concluded that the terms of a pro tanto release should be enforced
regardless of whether liability in a given case is apportioned
according to the comparative negligence statute, or in accordance
with the pro rata principles of strict liability.90 Furthermore, the
court determined that a non-settling tortfeasor is not entitled to a
financial windfall in the form of a release of its joint and several
liability to the plaintiff simply because another joint tortfeasor had
the foresight to negotiate a settlement which ultimately turned out
to be to his or her financial advantage. 91 Any different holding
would result in the eradication of the principles of joint and several
liability, and constitute a judicial repeal of the provisions of the
UCATA.92
Editor's Note: Subsequent to the author's preparation of this
analysis of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's analysis of Baker v.
ACandS, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the case and
issued an opinion affirming the lower court, using an analysis
86. Id. at 1149. See Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1992). The court in Walton
concluded that allocations of liability among joint tortfeasors in a strict liability case should
not be made on the basis of comparative fault, but should be divided equally between the
parties. Id. at 462.
87. Baker, 729 A.2d at 1149. The court stated they would not read Walton so broadly,
and the case certainly did not suggest that joint and several liability should be abolished in
strict liability cases. Id.
88. Id. at 1150.
89. Id. See Charles v. Giant Eagle, 522 A.2d 1 (Pa 1987).
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substantially the same as that discussed here. See Baker v. ACandS,
755 A.2d 664 (Pa. 2000).

